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Abstract
The present paper analyzes two important aspects in the amplification process of the recent
financial crisis to the real economy, that is the securitisation of financial assets (and in particular of
loans and mortgages) and the growth of bank off-balance sheet activities, for instance through the
development of Special Purpose Vehicles, with specific attention to the US context. In particular, this
work aims to examine whether and how the increase in off-balance sheet credit exposure to credit
derivatives, mainly due to loan securitisation, may have affected the growth rate of loans over the past
few years, also by distinguishing different categories of loans.
For this purpose, we present the results of a panel fixed-effect estimation and of a panel VAR
analysis, using quarterly data from the balance sheets of 39 US commercial banks and for a period
between 1998 and 2008. The results show that a rise in off-balance credit exposure may have – after
some time lags - a negative impact on the growth rate of bank lending, due to the potential and actual
losses related to the off-balance sheet activities. However, the effects on the single categories of loans
depend on their maturity: the negative effect due to an increase in off-balance sheet exposure is
stronger for long-term loans, like mortgages or real estate loans, while some positive impact on bank
lending may arise for short-term loans, such as commercial and industrial loans, because of the
liquidity/maturity transformation function associated with securitisation activities.
The results of the paper regarding the impact of an increase in off-balance sheet exposures on
bank deleveraging process may have some relevant policy implications for the design of financial
regulation, particularly in the area of shadow banking, supporting the current policy initiatives for the
revision of risk weights in securitisation exposures as well as for the implementation of consolidation
regimes concerning bank off-balance sheet activities.
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis, originated in the US subprime mortgage market, has
produced an enormous impact on the level of the real activity in the entire world, because of a
relevant amplification process of the financial shocks, caused by the high leverage of
financial institutions and by the large diffusion of loan securitisations in credit
intermediation. Indeed, most banks have registered relevant losses in their on-balance sheet
assets due to the write-offs of impaired loans as well as in their off-balance sheet activities
related to credit derivatives. Then, such losses have produced substantial effects on bank
balance sheets, since many credit institutions had to employ large capital reserves in order to
compensate for losses. As a consequence of that, and given the regulatory framework
requiring the fulfilment of capital-asset ratios, the reduction of equity capital due to losses has
induced a general contraction in credit supply to the private sector.
Given that, the present paper aims to focus on two important elements in this
mechanism of financial accelerator, working through the supply side of the credit market.
The two aspects of interest, which are intrinsically related in the current process of credit
intermediation, are the increase in securitisation activities (in particular of loans and
mortgages) and the growth of bank off-balance sheet items, for instance through the
development of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) or other similar separated legal entities.
Indeed, in the last decade we have observed a dramatic rise in credit securitisation,
both in the US and in Europe, even if with some relevant differences. In fact, while in the US
banks had largely used loan securitisation already during the nineties, in Europe banks started
a systematic use of securitisation techniques only after the introduction of the Euro. However,
in both cases, the volume of credit derivative issuances has increased in an impressive way in
the last decade and it has registered a decrease only after 2007, as we can notice from figure 1
regarding the US credit derivatives market.
But the increase in securitisation issuances is just one element of the overall issue.
Indeed, in the run-up to the crisis, many banks have extensively invested in these structured
finance products, such Asset-Backed Securities (ABSs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs), also because attracted by the high credit rating assigned to some of these derivatives.
In particular, since the exposures to securitisation activities were subject to quite lax risk-
based capital requirements due to their assumingly low credit risk, this has created
3Figure 1: The increase in credit derivative issuances in the US from 2000 to 2008
Source: Blanchard (2009)
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage: then, the investment in high rating credit derivatives
has been exploited by credit institutions in order to increase bank leverage and to improve
their capital charge regime at the same time. As a consequence of that, at the beginning of the
crisis many banks had quite substantial exposures to credit derivatives. In fact, banks were
exposed both because they had bought some tranches of structured credit products for loans
originated by other banks, and because they had kept some tranches of credit derivatives
based on their own loans.
Moreover, in many cases, when it was allowed by the consolidation regimes, those
investments have been undertaken by using shadow banking entities, outside of the official
banking sector. Indeed, particularly in the US before the crisis, a substantial part of the credit
exposure related to securitisation activities was born by banks through special purpose
vehicles or, more generally, through legal entities not included in the bank balance sheets.
This was also the result of distortionary incentives created by the existing regulation for
banking institutions. Indeed, the rules on bank capital requirements, not always
complemented by appropriate consolidation rules, had created an incentive for banks to
increase their off-balance sheet items in particular with securitisation activities.
The facts above summarized provide the actual motivation for this empirical work,
which is focused on the US context, as this is quite paradigmatic for the interrelation between
asset-backed securitisation and off-balance sheet credit exposure. Indeed, the objective of this
empirical study is to analyze the impact of the exponential growth of asset securitisation and
off-balance sheet exposure on bank lending in the US over the past few years, also by
distinguishing different categories of loans. More precisely, we want to examine whether and
how the increase in the off-balance sheet credit derivative exposure, mainly due to a larger
diffusion of loan securitisation, may have affected – with some time lags - the growth rate of
bank loans for US commercial banks.
This research question can be particularly relevant with regard to the recent events in
the banking system: indeed, as a consequence of the crisis, most banks affected by the losses
4on their off-balance sheet securitisation activities have implemented a substantial
deleveraging process, by tightening the credit supply to the private sector. Moreover, the
answer to this research question may also have some significant policy implications for the
design of financial regulation, both for the reform of bank capital requirements (as set by
Basel agreements, now Basel III) and for the regulation of the financial intermediaries
operating in the shadow banking system.
Indeed, the results of the work show that a rise in off-balance credit exposure may
have – after some time lags - a negative impact on the growth rate of bank lending, due to the
potential and actual losses related to the off-balance sheet activities. The conclusions of the
analysis imply that the new bank capital rules should pursue the objective of correctly
evaluating the credit risk of a given exposure and of eliminating all the existing incentives for
banks to expand off-balance sheet activities. This problem is particularly important because
of the large diffusion –over the past few years - of a shadow banking system, including all the
entities outside of the regular banking system but still involved in credit intermediation, either
because they directly take part in the securitisation process at different stages (loan
warehousing, derivative structuring or securities distribution) or because they support the
maturity/liquidity transformation process (for instance through credit enhancements)1.
Moreover, in many cases, the shadow banking system comprises also some bank-owned
entities (as it is for many special purpose vehicles), which are used by banks simply to
circumvent and undermine banking regulation: this clearly raises additional concerns in terms
of regulatory arbitrage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the theoretical
literature on the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy. Section 3 summarizes
the existing empirical evidence on macro-financial linkages, focusing on the literature
regarding the impact of bank capital shocks and the role of securitisation for bank lending.
Section 4 discusses the link between asset securitisation and bank off-balance sheet credit
exposure and introduces the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis. Section 5
describes the data and defines the variables considered in the study. Section 6 introduces the
econometric methodology and explains the reasons for using a panel VAR model. Section 7
presents the outcomes of the panel fixed effects estimation and section 8 describes the results
obtained from the panel VAR analysis. Then, section 9 concludes and section 10 provides
some insights for further research.
1 For a discussion on the definition of the shadow banking system and on the identification of the credit
intermediaries to be included under this label, see the report by the Financial Stability Board (2011)
52. The Transmission of Financial Shocks to the Real Economy: a Theoretical Overview
Before the events of the financial crisis, the literature on macro-financial linkages had
already provided some important contributions to explain the process through which financial
shocks can produce effects on the real side of the economy, given the frictions existing in the
credit market (and then affecting the level of firms' investments): in particular, the theory of
the financial accelerator by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) and the theory of credit
cycles by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). These studies focus the attention on the balance sheet
of the borrowers and so on their creditworthiness, evaluated according to the value of their
collaterals: in a lending relationship characterized by asymmetric information, a decrease in
the value of the collaterals implies an increase in the external finance premium required by
lenders and then a flight to quality in the loan supply, as creditors are willing to lend only to
debtors offering large collaterals. As a consequence of that, the financial shocks which affect
the borrowers’ balance sheet may produce a contraction of credit supply to the private sector,
either because banks refuse to lend to firms with insufficient collaterals or because such firms
cannot afford to pay an interest rate sensibly higher because of the external finance premium.
For many years, this perspective of analysis has represented the standard paradigm for
the study of the relationship between financial frictions and macroeconomic performance.
Nevertheless, it doesn’t provide any specific consideration for the financial conditions of the
banking system and then it doesn’t consider those situations where the contraction in credit
supply may depend on solvency or liquidity issues directly regarding financial intermediaries,
as it has been the case – for example – in the recent financial crisis. Indeed, most of the
problems observed in the last few years in the credit market have concerned not only the
demand side (through a change in the value of the collaterals of the borrowers, as above
described), but much more the supply side of that market (because of the reduction in the
value of the assets in or off the balance sheets of the financial institutions, due to the losses in
credit derivative instruments).
In the meanwhile, in the past few years, some other studies had also considered the
role of bank capital in the transmission of financial shocks to the real activity. Indeed, a
reduction in bank capital may determine a decrease in the amount of bank loans available to
the private sector, given that in any case the total sum of deposits remains unchanged and
provided that the bank has to keep the same capital-asset ratio. For this reason, the literature
on the bank capital channel emphasizes how shocks to bank capital may produce a
contraction in bank lending and then a reduction in investments, especially in an economy
where firms strongly depend on bank credit in order to finance their own investments and
cannot rely on other sources of funding.
In particular, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) develop a model with firms,
intermediaries and investors, where investors provide equity capital to banks and then banks
supply loans to firms to fund their investment projects. In this framework, since financial
intermediaries can finance loans only by capital, a shock to bank capital implies a contraction
in total loans. Clearly, this result depends on a strong simplification, given that it takes away
a major component of bank liabilities, that is customer deposits. Nevertheless, this
6assumption might not affect results so deeply if we consider that - in practice - banks cannot
act to induce an increase in customer deposits and that, in a period with relevant shocks to
bank capital, depositors might consider – on the contrary – the possibility to withdraw their
money from a bank, if they perceive a high probability of a bank run in the next future.
Another reason of the relationship between bank capital and bank lending concerns
the non-deposit funds that a given bank obtains from other financial intermediaries in the
interbank market. Indeed, also for banks the cost of getting funds in that market sensibly
depends on the perceived creditworthiness of the institution, as it is evaluated by the other
intermediaries on the basis of its financial position (and then of its capital adequacy to face
eventual shocks). Stein (1998) presents an adverse selection based model of bank asset and
liability management, where banks can face difficulties in raising funds with instruments
other than uninsured deposits. Indeed, while depositors are guaranteed by the existence of
deposit insurance, the financial institutions lending funds through the interbank market may
get some losses also because they are not fully informed about the effective financial
condition of their counterparty. For this reason, they should be induced to demand a higher
interest rate on interbank loans to banks with inadequate capital, where this external finance
premium negatively depends on the amount of bank capital. In practice, if there exists an
adverse selection problem, such that a financial institution cannot distinguish banks with
higher or lower capital adequacy, also due to the contagion risk coming from the network
connections among banks, the increase in the interest rate will affect all the intermediaries
operating in the interbank market. Then, as a final step in this argument, the higher costs
faced to obtain interbank loans are reflected in the higher interest rate required by banks for
loans to firms and households, with a consequent drop in the amount of bank loans.
3. The Transmission of Financial Shocks to the Real Economy: the Empirical Evidence
In the analysis of the existing empirical evidence, I will focus on the literature
studying the impact of bank capital shocks on bank lending and the effects of credit
securitisation on bank loans.
The early empirical evidence on the bank capital channel is mostly based on aggregate
analyses, aimed at observing the effect of the average capital-asset ratio on the growth rate of
loans, like in the paper by Bernanke, Lown and Friedman (1991). After that, most of the
literature on the bank capital channel (Hancock and Wilcox, 1994; Hancock, Laing and
Wilcox, 1995) has analyzed – using panel data for individual banks - the effects of bank
capital shocks on the amount of bank loans, showing how a reduction in bank capital may
determine a decrease in the amount of loans available to the private sector. The results of
such empirical studies confirm the importance - for the banking system - of keeping an
adequate level of capital to face eventual shocks and then provide an important support for
the argument requiring a strengthening of bank capital requirements in terms of capital-asset
ratio, as provided in the recent reform of Basel agreements.
7Nevertheless this approach, simply focused on the impact of bank capital shocks, may
present some limitations, both from the empirical point of view, and from the viewpoint of
the policy implications. Firstly, this setting for the empirical analysis, assuming the
exogeneity of bank capital shocks, doesn’t consider the causes which may determine a
reduction or an increase of bank capital. In fact, a shock to bank capital may be produced by
several factors, but in most cases, when the shocks are negative, the main reason is the
compensation of losses in bank assets with a reduction in bank capital reserves. For this
reason, it would be interesting to define the causes of such losses and then to identify the
categories of assets (securities, loans) on which such losses have been registered. Of course,
this type of analysis requires the availability of bank balance sheet data with a high level of
disaggregation.
Secondly, once the results of the analysis are used to derive some policy implications
in terms of banking regulation, a perspective based exclusively on bank capital may limit the
range of policy measures required to preserve the financial stability of the banking system,
simply because it might ignore the true and ultimate sources of the financial instability.
Indeed, the policy solutions focused on the increase of the regulatory bank capital
requirements might not fully eliminate the risks of financial instability for two reasons: either
because the threshold fixed for the capital requirement, although substantially high, might not
be sufficient and should be further increased, as argued by Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano
(2011) 2; or because the appropriate policy measures should rather focus on the potential
sources of bank losses, which may require at some point a reduction in bank capital, and then
should aim to reduce the distortionary incentives for securitisation activities.
In fact, some recent papers have also analyzed the impact of securitisation on bank
lending, with particular attention to the European Banks. In particular, Altunbas, Gambacorta
and Marqués-Ibaňes (2009), study the massive increase in securitisation observed in Europe 
after the introduction of the Euro and examine the corresponding impact on the growth rate of
loans, using a sample of 3000 banks in the Euro area for the period 1999-2005. The key
objective of their paper is to analyze whether securitisation may affect the bank lending
channel of monetary policy, by making bank loan supply independent from the monetary
policy stance. Indeed, the results show that securitisation activity increases bank lending,
2 Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano (2011) propose an analysis on the optimal level of bank capital, based on a
comparison between social benefits and costs from having higher levels of loss-absorbing capital. In particular,
they estimate the bank financing costs due to an increase in equity funding and then calibrate their impact on the
output level for the wider economy. At the same time, they quantify the benefits of higher capital requirements
in terms of lower probability of crisis and then compute the expected losses in output implied by a banking
crisis. On the basis of such comparison of benefits and costs, the socially optimal level of bank capital would be
much larger than the amount held by banks in the recent years and also higher than the targets set by Basel III
agreements.
8given that banks can use the revenues from securitisation as a funding source to grant
additional loans3.
Moreover, Carbó-Valverde, Marqués-Ibaňes and Rodríguez Fernández (2011) analyze 
the impact of securitisation on bank lending and on credit quality, using a dataset of
Mortgage-Backed Securities and Asset-Backed Securities issued by Spanish banks4 and
matching such information with quarterly data from bank balance sheets for a period from
2000 to 2010. The results of the analysis show that an increase in the volume of securitized
loans in the last 4 quarters induces a rise in the growth rate of loans and that a credit
expansion, fuelled by large securitisations, negatively affects loan performance with a lag of
at least two years (by augmenting the ratio of non-performing loans over total assets).
Moreover, the overall bank loan performance can explain ex-post rating changes with a lag of
four quarters, since lower credit quality (as proved by a high rate of non-performing loans)
may induce rating agencies to downward revise the issuer’s rating.
4. Why Focusing on Asset Securitisation and Bank Off-Balance Sheet Credit Exposure?
The recent crisis has shown that the off-balance sheet items of a bank can generate
relevant losses with a direct impact on the bank balance sheet, especially when such activities
– as in the case of credit derivatives - imply a high credit exposure for the bank. For this
reason, the present work focuses on the impact of credit derivative exposure, as mainly
determined by asset securitisations, on the total amount as well as on the growth rate of loans.
Before presenting the methodology and the data used in the analysis, it is worth displaying
the main channels through which securitisation may have an impact on bank lending and to
explain the link between asset securitisation and off-balance sheet credit exposure, as
emerged in the recent approach to bank asset and liability management.
Loan securitisation can affect the supply of bank loans in two different ways. On one
side, it may induce an increase in the amount of loans, because the originator banks which
securitize their assets (and in particular their loans) can use the additional liquidity coming
from securitisation revenues to finance new loans. Let consider the case of a residential
mortgage issued for a long time period: in this case loan securitisation may play an important
function of liquidity and maturity transformation. Indeed, if the bank couldn’t securitize
loans, it should keep such an immobilized asset in its balance sheet for that period, waiting
3 Nevertheless, it is worth to clarify that such result was obtained for a sample of bank balance sheets until 2005,
so in a period preceding the recent financial crisis. This implies that the data on bank loans don’t consider the
impact of significant negative shocks to bank assets or to off-balance sheet activities.
4 The Spanish case represents a very interesting case-study for the analysis of the causes of the banking crisis
and of the effects of the financial shocks on the real economy, because of the large development in loan
securitisation – especially for residential mortgages - and of the consequent housing bubble.
9for the entire repayment of the mortgage, and then it couldn’t use that asset for any other
employ (liquidity transformation). Moreover, securitisation allows banks to expand the
amount of credit to other borrowers different from households, since the revenues from
securitisation of long-term mortgages can be used to finance short-term commercial and
industrial loans (maturity transformation). In this way, because of loan securitisation, it is
possible for banks to expand their credit in a way which is quite independent from the
monetary policy stance (with the effect of reducing the importance of the bank lending
channel in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy).
Furthermore, securitisation may favour a credit expansion also because it
substantially changes the risk management approach of the bank: indeed, once a bank
securitizes a pool of loans, it doesn’t bear anymore the risk for that credit, unless it accepts to
keep some tranches of the asset backed securities in its balance sheet or it provides a
guarantee for principal and interest payments5. However, even in these cases, the credit risk
associated with a tranche of asset-backed securities is – or should be – lower than the credit
risk born by a bank for a set of homogeneous loans, provided to similar categories of
borrowers or in the same geographical area6 . Indeed, when several loans are pooled and
transferred to a vehicle issuer of asset backed securities, the default risk associated with the
repayment of a loan becomes idiosyncratic, because in a pool of heterogeneous loans the
probability of default is affected by different factors for each debtor. So, on one hand the
returns on asset-backed securities are paid by the issuer using the principal and interest
payments on securitized loans; but on the other hand, the credit derivative is structured such
that a given probability of defaults or delinquencies - for a small fraction of pooled loans –
shouldn’t affect the flow of returns to investors. As a consequence of that, the credit risk
born by a bank should sensibly decrease thanks to loan securitisation: this creates a strong
incentive for banks to use securitisations. Moreover, even when a banks plays the role of a
credit enhancer, it gets very high income fees from the issuer of the asset-backed security,
then it has an additional incentive to get involved in securitisations.
On the other side, an increase in loan securitisation might also induce a decrease in
bank lending, under particular financial market conditions affecting the portfolio value of the
banks exposed to credit derivatives. But, in order to understand that, we have to adopt another
perspective in the setting of the empirical analysis. Indeed, the impact of asset securitisation
can be studied not only from the side of the originator banks, but also from the viewpoint of
the financial institutions involved in the credit derivative underwriting or more generally
bearing the credit risk of such securities. In this perspective, we are interested in introducing
5 In general, an asset can be securitized if it offers a stable income stream to the investors. Nevertheless, the
contemporaneous default of a large number of borrowers, if not taken into account in the process of derivative
structuring, may reduce the flow of payments to investors. For this reason, there is still need of a credit
enhancer, like a bank or an insurance company, which provides liquidity lines to special purpose vehicles in
case of multiple shortfalls created by delinquencies or defaults and receives in exchange the payment of an
insurance fee for this service.
6 This might not be the case, as better explained in the following paragraph, in a situation of financial contagion.
10
some elements of innovation compared to the empirical literature, discussed in the previous
section, which examines the effects of securitisation on the amount of bank lending by the
originator banks. In fact, the positive impact observed in such analyses mostly reflects the
effect of the liquidity transformation function of securitisation, which is of course quite
relevant in determining the expansion of credit supply for the originator banks. For this
reason, in the empirical analysis of this paper we prefer to consider the credit derivative
exposure of commercial banks, whatever is the source of such exposure: in this perspective,
we don’t distinguish whether banks are exposed because they have bought some tranches of
ABSs for loans originated by other banks, or because they have kept some tranches of credit
derivatives based on their own loans, or again because they have offered a guarantee for the
repayment of a pool of securitized loans.
Once we take this broader approach for the empirical analysis, we can also explain
why, in a situation of high financial distress for the banking system, an increase in asset
securitisation may also have a negative impact on bank lending. Indeed, if there is a high risk
of contagion across financial institutions, the bank holder of some tranches of asset-backed
securities or the bank acting as a credit enhancer for a pool of securitized loans are not able to
correctly evaluate the probability of default of a counterparty, and then the credit risk
associated with a securitisation exposure, because of the uncertainty related to financial
position of the other institution.
In this framework, two possible facts can occur.
a) Without any previous expectation, a counterparty of a credit derivative contract
defaults, because it cannot obtain sources of short-term funding. We can consider, for
example, the case of a Structured Investment Vehicle, issuer of Asset-Backed Commercial
Paper, which doesn’t manage to find investors willing to underwrite its financial instruments.
This implies actual and unexpected losses for the banks exposed – for different reasons – to
the credit derivatives issued by this financial intermediary and then such losses may require a
reduction in capital. As a consequence of that, the exposed banks – unless they can further
increase their leverage - usually react to the effective losses to capital by reducing the amount
of credit available to households and firms. Indeed, this is something which we have
observed quite frequently in the recent financial crisis. But the following point is even more
relevant for our analysis.
b) In several cases, a bank doesn’t know exactly the financial position of a
counterparty for a credit derivative contract, but it expects a relatively high probability of
default for that intermediary. Because of that, the credit risk associated to a tranche of asset-
backed securities issued by that institution can be particularly high, even more than the credit
risk of the loans directly provided by the bank to its traditional borrowers. In this case, the
exposed bank doesn’t bear any effective loss, but – given the increase in the probability of
default of the issuer – it has to upward revise the value of the exposures to these securitisation
activities.
Then, this increase in the credit risk associated with securitisation tranches can be
transmitted to the bank capital of the exposed bank following two channels: one working
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through the losses to capital, the other one working through the risk-weighted capital
requirements. On one side, the rising credit risk related to a securitisation issuance may
induce a fall in the value of these structured finance products, which may ultimately affect the
bank balance sheets, by generating some substantial losses to the bank capital. At the same
time, the increasing credit risk associated with the securitisation tranches may determine an
increase in the minimum required capital that the banks have to hold for a given exposure
(i.e. the cliff effect for securitisation exposures). The combination of these two elements, i.e.
the losses from fair value adjustments and the increase in minimum capital requirements, can
then generate a substantial process of de-leveraging in the banking industry, which may
ultimately affects bank credit supply and then the amount of bank lending available to the
private sector.
In particular, for the purpose of the empirical analysis, it is worth to emphasize the
key role of the contagion risk in influencing the bank lending behaviour, especially in the
second presented circumstance. In fact, the concerns related to the possible default of a
counterparty have played an important role in determining the credit crunch after Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy, since many banks concerned about the potential losses from their
credit derivative exposure (because of the financial position of the issuers) decided to
contract the amount of loans to the private sector. The motive justifying such reduction in
bank lending can be considered mainly as a precautionary reason and in fact it is a function of
the degree of the uncertainty related to the financial position of the counterparty.
On the basis of the previous considerations, we can argue that securitisation may
induce effects of opposite signs on bank lending, so it is important to understand which effect
prevails and under which conditions. Indeed, this impact may be related also to the type of
loan, and then to its maturity, because of the liquidity/maturity transformation function of
securitisation. For instance, construction loans and residential mortgages are mostly long-
term loans, while commercial or industrial loans are prevailingly short-term loans. So an
increase in securitisation may affect those categories of loans in a different way depending on
their maturity.
For instance, we can think of two possible cases to illustrate the above mentioned
argument. Let us consider the case of a bank which securitizes some mortgages or other long-
term loans, keeping some tranches of credit derivatives or issuing a partial guarantee for the
repayment of loans, such to increase in any case its off-balance sheet credit exposure; after
that, the bank will not probably use the securitisation revenues to issue new long-term loans,
but it will likely decide to provide new short-term loans, exploiting the liquidity/maturity
transformation function of credit securitisation. Then, a similar reasoning can be proposed
also for the banks which are not the loan originators in the securitisation but which increase
their off-balance sheet credit exposure for providing explicit credit guarantees or committed
liquidity lines to SPVs: also in this case, given the potential losses coming from the increase
in the off-balance sheet activities, the bank could prefer to keep more liquid assets, and then it
could avoid to increase the amount of long-term loans. As we can see from these examples, in
the perspective of observing the final impact on bank lending, the position of originator bank
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is not necessarily so relevant, while the type of loans can be more important in explaining the
effects of an increase in bank off-balance sheet activities.
5. The Data
An empirical analysis aimed at observing the impact of asset securitisation and off-
balance sheet credit exposure on bank loans requires the availability of detailed data about
bank on-balance sheet assets and liabilities as well as about off-balance sheet activities.
While complete data on bank balance sheets can be easily obtained from the reports
published by banks for their shareholders, the data on off-balance sheet items are not
indicated in a complete way in such reports, because the information duties that financial
institutions have to fulfil in such case are rather limited. For this reason, the best source of
data for off-balance sheet activities is given by the regulatory reports that banks have to
submit to Financial Supervision Authorities. In this way, we can have at least some bank-
specific data for the notional amount of credit derivatives, interest rate or foreign exchange
contracts, for loan commitments as well as in general for off-balance sheet credit exposure.
Indeed, banks have to declare such data, as they are required to compute the equivalent
amount of weighted-risk assets, which is relevant for the fulfilment of the regulatory capital-
asset ratios.
For this reason, I use the data available through the Bank Regulatory Database, which
includes several datasets for regulated financial institutions in the US. In particular, the
Commercial Bank Dataset, from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, contains data for all
the commercial banks, regulated by the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, which must fill the Report of Condition and Income (named “Call
Report”). The Commercial Bank Dataset has quarterly data available from 1976 to 2008 for
1722 US commercial banks.
In particular, for the purpose of this analysis I will consider the data from the 1st
quarter of 1998 to the 4th quarter of 2008 (the last one currently available), that is for 44
quarters. The reason for this choice is related to the scope of the empirical study and to the
availability of data: even if the foundation of the US public companies involved in credit
securitisation - Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae7 - is chronologically anterior, we can observe a
reasonably large diffusion of credit securitisation in the US starting from the nineties but we
can have satisfactory regulatory data on bank off-balance sheet activities only from the end of
the nineties. Moreover, regarding the banks considered in the analysis, I restrict the dataset to
7 Freddie Mac is an acronym for Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), while Fannie Mae is an
acronym for Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Both of them were created by the US
Government to expand the secondary mortgage market by securitizing mortgages in the form of Mortgage
Backed Securities.
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the largest 39 US commercial banks (according to the value of their assets), because only for
these banks I have complete or at least exhaustive data for off-balance sheet activities. In any
case, this choice shouldn’t determine a substantial selection bias for the results of the
empirical analysis, given that the largest 39 US banks (as identified for the last quarter of
2008) represent 79.68% of the total amount of consolidated assets held by US commercial
banks. So, the trend in bank lending that we observe for the banks included in the dataset
should explain in a relatively satisfactory way the trend in bank lending for the overall US
banking system.
For the dependent variable, I consider the data on the total amount of loans, as well as
the specific data for several categories of loans, such as residential mortgages, non-residential
mortgages, construction loans, real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, agricultural
loans. Indeed, I am interested in analyzing the impact of credit derivative exposure on each of
these categories of loans, given that the effects could be different because of the liquidity and
maturity transformation function played by credit securitisation, as described in the previous
section.
The graph presented in figure 2 shows the yearly growth rate of loans for the 8 largest
domestic bank holdings8 and for all the other commercial banks from 2004 to 2010, in order
to compare the evolution of bank loans before and after the crisis, during the period
characterized by the largest diffusion of credit securitisation and off-balance sheet activities.
Firstly, we notice that the growth rate of loans by the largest bank holdings follows a quite
volatile path, while the growth rate of loans by the other commercial banks is more stable.
Moreover, we observe that in both cases, even after the beginning of the financial crisis
(August 2007), the growth rate of loans remains positive at least until the beginning of 2009
and, in particular, it even increases for the largest bank holdings. Then, due to the effects of
Lehman’s bankruptcy, the growth rate of total loans becomes negative in early-2009 for the
largest bank holdings and in mid-2009 for the other commercial banks.
For this reason, we can properly talk about a credit crunch for the US economy, in the
sense of a sensible reduction in the level of bank lending, only after Lehman’s bankruptcy.
However, this credit contraction operates in a different way depending on the bank size:
while the largest bank holdings register before a sudden drop in the growth rate (up to -8% in
September 2009) and then they observe a substantial increase (up to +4% in March 2010), the
other commercial banks show a more gradual and persistent decrease for a longer period such
that the growth rate of loans is still negative during the entire 2010. This can be explained by
two factors: the credit provided by the largest bank holdings depends more on bank-specific
supply factors, related to the credit policy chosen by the holding, while the credit granted by
the other commercial banks is more affected by the general conditions of loan demand.
8 The group includes the following banks: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, US
Bancorp, PNC, Bank of New York Mellon and Capital One
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Figure 2. The growth rate of loans by US commercial banks from 2004 to 2010
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2011)
Moreover, the largest bank holdings present a wider drop in credit supply during 2009
because they suffered a larger amount of losses from credit derivatives and from impaired
loans, compared to the other commercial banks.
Concerning the explanatory variables, I want to compare the effects on total loans
both of the shocks affecting on-balance sheet securities and of the shocks regarding off-
balance sheet activities. In order to determine the volume of on-balance sheet securities, I
don’t consider the classification between held-to-maturity debt securities, trading debt and
equity securities and available-for-sale debt and equity, which is based on the bank’s intended
use of that security, because this distinction is relevant simply to specify the accounting
treatment of the single asset in the balance sheet. On the contrary, it is more relevant – from
an economic point of view – to consider the total amount of securities at the market value,
independently from the previous distinction: indeed, the aim of the analysis is to observe the
shocks to the value of securities, as determined in the fluctuations of financial markets, and
then to verify whether the changes in the asset portfolio value may have an impact on bank
lending, comparing also this impact with the effects of shocks to off-balance sheet credit
exposure.
The other explanatory variable is the current credit exposure to the off-balance sheet
derivative contracts covered by the risk based capital standards. Here the credit risk
associated to a derivative contract is the risk of losses that will be incurred in the case of
default by the counterparty. Then credit exposure must be determined, according to the
techniques used in credit risk measurement, as the cost of replacing the contract at the time of
default. For the purposes of our analysis, it is important to observe that credit exposure is the
maximum amount which can be potentially lost in the event of a default by the counterparty,
so it is higher than the actual amount of losses effectively born by the bank. In this way, such
variable can capture an interesting aspect in the process of credit intermediation: a bank can
deliberately decrease the amount of loans, or the growth rate of loans, if it has a large off-
balance sheet credit exposure, not only because it has already registered some effective
losses, but because it could bear some substantial losses in the future. This would allow us to
take into account not only the effects of the actual losses from off-balance sheet activities, but
also the impact of the contagion risk related to the potential default of a counterparty. That is
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the reason why I prefer to use the off-balance sheet credit exposure rather than, for example,
the allowance for losses on off-balance sheet activities, which reflects the actual losses
carried by a bank and compensated through bank capital reserves9.
6. The Empirical Methodology
After describing the dataset, we can present the framework for the empirical analysis
and illustrate the implemented econometric methodology: preliminarily, I estimate a panel
fixed effects model for the growth rate of loans; then, I introduce a panel VAR model to
analyze the impact of shocks to off-balance credit exposure and to securities market value on
the amount and on the growth rate of loans. Given this structure of the work, it is worth
analyzing the econometric issues related to each part of the empirical study, in order to
explain why the panel VAR approach should be preferred to the panel fixed effects
estimation.
In the first part of the work, I analyze a panel with fixed effects for individual banks.
Here I use as a dependent variable the growth rate of loans, computed as the difference
between the logs of loans in time t and in time t-1. Indeed, the use of the growth rate of loans
allows to remove a component of trend stationarity characterizing the variables of this
empirical study. Indeed, some of the variables included in the dataset, such as the amount of
loans or the off-balance credit exposure, follow an increasing trend, given that they are
expressed in monetary values. For this reason, a regression including the logarithm of each
variable would present a typical problem of spurious regression. On the other hand, the
growth rate of loans doesn’t follow any specific trend, so we can examine the impact of a
variation in off-balance credit exposure or in securities market value on the loan growth rate,
without incurring in problems of non-stationarity. Then the estimated regression equation is:
ititititiit uCAPITEQUITYSECURMARKETDEREXPCRELOANSG  _ln_ln__ln_ 321 
where αi is the individual fixed effect for a bank i, G_LOANSit is the growth rate of loans
(total loans or specific categories of loans) for bank i in quarter t, lnCRE_EXP_DERit is the
log of off-balance credit exposure to derivatives, lnMARKET_SECUR is the log of the market
value of on-balance securities and lnEQUITY_CAPIT is the log of the equity capital.
Now, we have to clarify the reasons for choosing a fixed effects estimator rather than
a random effects estimator. We can discuss the issue considering two aspects: the objectives
and the features of the empirical analysis and the indications provided by the specification
tests. Firstly, the framework of the analysis would suggest to employ a fixed effects
estimator, given that we are examining the bank lending behaviour of different financial
9 Moreover, I could also add another practical justification: while the loan loss allowance and the allowance for
losses on marketable securities are explicitly indicated in the balance sheet, the allowances for off-balance sheet
losses are not clearly presented in the bank financial reports.
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institutions over time. So we can suppose that there are some unobserved components
characterizing the conduct of the same bank, which don’t change over time. In any case, to
check the validity of this choice, I also implement a Hausman specification test to verify the
hypothesis of no systematic difference between the coefficients resulting from fixed effects
and random effects estimators. As shown in table 1, the results of the test - for the
specification including the growth rate of total loans as dependent variable - don’t provide
univocal indications in favour of one or another solution. Indeed, in two cases the chi-square
statistics is significant, so indicating that the random effects estimator might be inconsistent
due to the correlation between the explanatory variables and the individual random effect;
while in other two cases, the chi-square statistics is not significant, so implying that the
random effects GLS estimator might be not only efficient but also consistent. In absence of
clear results from the Hausman test, the economic logic underlying the empirical analysis
induces to employ a fixed effects estimator. This is the reason why, for the regressions
including the growth rate of specific categories of loans, I only present the results of a panel
fixed effects estimation.
The standard regression equation includes the explanatory variables, observed at the
same time of the dependent variable: the results of this specification should then explain the
simultaneous effects of credit derivative exposure and securities market value on the current
growth rate. Moreover, to take into account the propagation process of the shocks affecting
the growth rate of loans, I also use some lagged values of the explanatory variables. Then,
depending on the number of lags, the basic regression equation can be written as follows:
itnitnitnitiit uCAPIT_EQUITYlnSECUR_MARKETlnDER_EXP_CRElnLOANS_G   321 
where n defines the number of lagged quarters. This specification with lagged explanatory
variables should then capture the lagged effects – if there are - that changes in off-balance
credit exposure or in securities market value can produce on the growth rate of loans.
Nevertheless, the introduction of lagged values of the explanatory variables could not
be sufficient to fully understand the dynamics in the process of credit intermediation. In fact,
since the bank lending policy influences the credit provision over time, or simply because
there is some inertia, we can reasonably argue that the growth rate of loans in the previous
period might also affect the growth rate of loans in the following periods: for this reason, it
would be interesting to add also the lagged value of the loan growth rate. However, this can
create problems of inconsistency for the fixed effects estimator, due to the correlation
between the individual fixed component in the lagged dependent variable and the error term
in the regression equation. Then, the Within estimator would be biased and inconsistent.
Indeed, since the estimation bias is O (1/T), we can argue that the bias would decrease and
then the fixed effects estimator would become consistent only when T gets large.10 But in our
case, we have N=39 and T=44, so the amount of T is not large enough to claim that the fixed
10 For more details on that, see the discussion on dynamic panel data models by Baltagi (2008)
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effects estimator may be consistent. This is the reason why a panel VAR estimation should be
considered as highly appropriate for such analysis.
Indeed, the Panel VAR methodology (Holtz Eakin, Newey and Rose, 1988) has been
already implemented in some empirical papers on the bank capital channel (Hancock, Laing
and Wilcox, 1995; Mora and Logan, 2010). In particular, in the estimation of the Panel VAR
model, I apply the program developed for Stata by Love and Zicchino (2006). In order to
solve the issue of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term,
the model is estimated by using a GMM procedure, as proposed for dynamic panel data by
Arellano and Bover (1995): this method produces efficient IV estimators by using lagged
regressors as instruments.
However, before applying the GMM estimation method, I need to apply two
transformation procedure on the data. Firstly, in order to remove possible non-stationarity in
the data, I have to time-demean the data for the relevant variables. Then, in order to eliminate
the individual fixed effects, I also apply the Helmert transformation to the time-demeaned
data. At this point, I can implement the GMM procedure on Helmert- transformed data. In
particular, for the purpose of the estimation, I consider the following order for the variables:
off-balance credit exposure, securities market value and then bank lending (in logs or in
growth rates). The choice of this order can be explained, on the basis of the hypotheses
outlined in section 4, because the shocks to the credit derivative exposure show a higher
degree of exogeneity compared to the other variables. Indeed, in most of the cases, such
shocks are related to the probability of default of a counterparty, which is a different financial
intermediary. Then, after the GMM estimation of the coefficients, I can compute and
represent the impulse response functions for the shocks to off-balance credit exposure and
securities market value.
As above explained, the use of a Panel VAR analysis, based on time-demeaned data,
removes eventual non-stationarity problems: in this way, I can examine the effects on bank
lending, by considering two variables, both the amount of loans (in logs) and the growth rate
of loans. The reason why I include both specifications (rather than just the amount of lending)
is due to the empirical facts observed in the data about bank lending: indeed, even after the
beginning of the financial crisis, we observe for some quarters a reduction in the growth rate
of loans but not also a contraction in the level of bank lending, at least until mid-2009. For
this reason, an analysis focused also on the growth rate of loans could provide some other
insights, in addition to the results of the study based on the amount of loans (in logs).
7. The Results of the Panel Fixed Effects Estimation
As a first step in the empirical analysis, we consider y about the impact of off-balance
sheet credit exposure and of securities market value on the growth rate of loans (total loans or
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specific categories of loans). Then, in the following section, we will analyze the outcomes
obtained from the Panel VAR analysis.
Let us focus firstly on the regression with the growth rate of total loans as a dependent
variable. Just for this part of the analysis, as anticipated in the previous section, I will
compare the outcomes obtained from two different specifications of the panel regression, i.e.
the one using a fixed effects estimator and the one adopting a random effects estimator, also
on the basis of the results of the Hausman test. We can observe such results in table 1.
The specifications 1-4 describe the results for the static panel: in the fixed effects
estimation, only the coefficient for credit derivative exposure is significant and negative. This
means that a 1-percent increase in off-balance credit exposure reduces the growth rate of total
loans by 0.034% (col.1) or 0.036% (col.3). These figures are quite relevant if we consider the
Table 1. The Impact on the Growth Rate of Total Loans
GROWTH RATE OF TOTAL LOANS






























































No. Observations 342 342 342 342 309 309 290 290
*, **, *** indicate respectively statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level
effective growth rates for total loans and for credit derivative exposure, as registered in the
last few years. At this regard, let consider some descriptive statistics for the last two years of
our sample (2007- 2008): during that period, the average quarterly growth rate of total loans
was equal to 2.39%, while the average quarterly growth rate of credit derivative exposure was
equal to 22.98%. As a consequence of that, a sudden increase in off-balance credit exposure
by 25% (or by 50%) - absolutely normal or quite common for that period – would determine
a decrease in the growth rate of loans by 0.9% (or by 1.8%) and then it would reduce the
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growth rate to 1.5% (or to 0.6%). In a similar way, we can also argue that the growth rate of
loans may become negative, after a 65% increase to credit derivative exposure. This
immediate and negative impact of off-balance credit exposure on the growth rate of loans
could display – as discussed in section 4 – a contagion risk effect: indeed a rise in credit
exposure, implying an increase in the potential losses from off-balance sheet items, and in
particular from securitisation activities, may induce banks to contract lending, by reducing
the growth rate of loans.
This contagion risk effect, as it is based just on the concern for the potential losses
coming from a counterparty’s default and so it doesn’t involve any actual variation in bank
capital, would work immediately after the shock to credit exposure: for this reason, the
magnitude of the negative effect should be larger in the same period of the shock and then it
should decrease in the specifications including the lagged values of the explanatory variables.
Indeed, as we can notice from columns 5-8, the coefficient for credit exposure is still
significant in the specification with one quarter lag, but it is not anymore in the regression
with two lags.
Moreover, as we can notice from the observation of the results, the coefficient for the
market value of on-balance securities is never significant in the specifications including a
small number of lags, while the coefficient for off-balance credit exposure is significant at
least for one quarter lag. This could support the argument that the contagion risk effect not
only operates in the very short-run, but it is more relevant for off-balance sheet activities than
for on-balance sheet securities: indeed, in many cases - also for regulatory arbitrage purposes
related to the different weighted risk for on and off-balance sheet activities - the derivative
contracts registered off-balance sheet display higher credit risk than the on-balance sheet
securities. For this reason, if there is a concern about a potential counterparty default, in the
very short-run a shock to credit derivative exposure can produce a larger impact than a shock
to on-balance sheet securities.
Then we can consider the impact of the same explanatory variables on the growth rate of
some specific categories of loans. In table 2, I present the results of the regression for the
growth rate of residential mortgages and real estate loans: as we have observed for total
loans, an increase of credit derivative exposure can determine in the same time period a
decrease in the growth rate of loans, for both categories of bank lending. The magnitude of
the effect is almost identical for both, as a 1-percent increase in off-balance credit exposure
reduces the growth rate of residential mortgages (col.2) and of real estate loans (col.4) by
around 0.041%. As before, the size of these coefficients has to be evaluated by taking into
account the quarterly growth rate of credit derivative exposure, in particular for the last
period (2007-2008): indeed, an increase in credit derivative exposure by 25% (or by 50%) –
the first one absolutely normal and the second one quite common for that period – would
determine a decrease in the growth rate of loans by 1.025% (or by 2.05%), while the average
quarterly growth rate of residential mortgages during those years was equal to 2.73% and the
average quarterly growth rate of real estate loans was equal to 2.76%.
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Bank Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. Observations 342 342 309 290 342 342 309 290
*, **, *** indicate respectively statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level
Also in this case, we can observe the negative impact of contagion risk, which is even
accentuated in terms of magnitude because both residential mortgages and real estate loans
are long-term loans and then very illiquid assets, so banks are not interested in keeping them
especially in a period characterized by an increase in off-balance credit exposure. Moreover,
as we have noticed for total loans, the coefficient for credit exposure is still significant in the
specification with one quarter lag (col.3 and 7), but it is not anymore in the regression with
two lags (col.4 and 8).
Finally, we can examine the impact on the growth rate of commercial and industrial
loans and of agricultural loans, as presented in table 3. Here the effect of an increase in off-
balance credit exposure is completely opposite. Indeed, in the specification with simultaneous
explanatory variables (col.1-2 and 5-6), there is no significant coefficient, while in the
regressions with 1 or 2 quarter lags (col. 3-4 and 7-8) I find significant and positive
coefficients. So this means that, for such categories of loans, a rise in credit derivative
exposure doesn’t produce any effect on the growth rate of loans in the same time period,
while it has a positive impact on the growth rate with one or two lags. We can provide a
possible explanation for these outcomes.
Both commercial and industrial loans, and agricultural loans can be considered,
compared to residential mortgages and real estate loans, as short-term loans. Then, as
explained in section 4, an increase in securitisation activities may have a positive impact on
such classes of loans, because of the discussed liquidity and maturity transformation
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Table 3. The Impact on the Growth Rate of Commercial & Industrial Loans and of Agricultural Loans
GROWTH RATE OF
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL LOANS
GROWTH RATE OF
AGRICULTURAL LOANS





























































Bank Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. Observations 342 342 309 290 307 307 280 262
*, **, *** indicate respectively statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level
function. However, this positive effect - working over time – can be offset by the negative
impact of contagion risk, which produces its largest effect at the same time of the change in
off-balance activities. Then, the results for these short-term loans, mainly aimed to finance
entrepreneurial activities can be explained in this way: at the time of the increase in off-
balance exposure, the negative effect due to the contagion risk would prevail, while in the
following quarters the positive impact due to the maturity transformation function would be
stronger.
8. The Results of the Panel VAR Analysis
The possible inconsistency of the fixed effects estimator in a dynamic panel including
a lagged dependent variable among the regressors, as well as the need to analyze the
complete dynamics of the variables over time, suggest us to run a Panel VAR analysis in
order to study the effects of shocks to the market value of on-balance sheet securities and to
the off-balance sheet credit exposure to derivatives. For the purpose of this analysis, I don’t
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include the equity capital because, in the framework outlined in section 4, the shocks
affecting the equity capital can be considered as consequences of the losses, and then of the
shocks regarding the market value of securities and the off-balance sheet credit exposure.
Moreover, an increase in credit exposure (so in the potential amount of losses in the case of
default of a counterparty) could negatively affect bank lending even without producing
effective losses and then consequent reductions in bank capital.
Another relevant issue arising in the specification of the Panel VAR regards the
choice of the lags to be included in the analysis. A consideration of the hypotheses presented
in section 4 could lead to opposite choices: indeed, the effective losses registered for on-
balance sheet securities or for off-balance sheet activities can take some time before
producing an impact on bank lending (after inducing a reduction in capital reserves), then this
would require the introduction of many time lags (up to 8 quarters); on the other side, the
reduction in bank lending simply due to the diffusion of contagion risk, after a given increase
in off-balance sheet credit exposure, could require a shorter period of time, so implying the
need for relatively few time lags. Then, the evolution of bank lending in the last few years, as
described in figure 3, could give an idea about the time persistency of shocks to the banking
system. For example, if we consider the impact of Lehman’s bankruptcy, we notice that the
propagation process from the time of the shock (September 2008) to the time of the lowest
(and negative) growth rate of loans took around 4 quarters (until September 2009) for the
largest bank holdings and about 6-7 quarters (until March-June 2010) for the other
commercial banks. For this reason, in the Panel VAR analysis of this paper I introduce a time
lag of 6 quarters for the variables considered in the estimation, but I present in the appendix
the results for the specification of the Panel VAR model with a 4-quarter lag.
8.1 The Impact of Shocks on the Amount of Loans
In order to discuss the results of the analysis, I will present the graphs of the impulse
response-functions obtained for shocks to the off-balance sheet credit derivative exposure and
to the market value of on-balance sheet securities. Firstly, I will consider the impact of such
shocks on the amount of bank loans (total loans and specific categories of loans). The lines
above and under the central one define the intervals for the errors, as generated by a Monte-
Carlo process with 500 repetitions.
Let us consider the impact on the total amount of loans, without any distinction
among specific categories. An increase in the credit exposure doesn’t imply a significant
effect on the amount of total loans (graph 1), probably because of the off-setting between
effects of opposite sign. Moreover, also a rise in securities market value doesn’t determines a
significant effect on bank loans (graph 2).
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Graph 1. Response of lnTOTAL_LOANS to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 2. Response of lnTOTAL_LOANS to lnMARKET_SECUR
Since the impulse response functions for the amount of total loans don’t provide any
clear indication, in order to have a broader idea, it is worth analyzing the impact on specific
categories of loans. To make the presentation shorter, I will focus on the effects of a shock to
off-balance sheet credit exposure, given that such results can sensibly change depending on
the type of loans. Then, let us examine in particular the impact on the amount of residential
mortgages (graph 3) and of construction loans (graph 4). After the shock, both residential
mortgages and construction loans show some tendency to a decrease, but in fact none of this
effect is statistically significant.
Graph 3. Response of lnRESID_MORT to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 4. Response of lnCONSTR_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER
Then, we can observe the effects on other categories of loans, that is commercial and
industrial loans (graph 5) and agricultural loans (graph 6). After a positive shock to credit
derivative exposure, commercial and industrial loans increase and here the positive effect is
significant at least until 3 quarters from the shock. Also agricultural loans – after a small
decrease just in the 1st quarter – tend to show a similar growth, but here the impact is not
significant. In both cases, an increase in off-balance sheet credit exposure seems to induce a
positive impact on such categories of loans. Indeed, these are prevalently short-term loans,
with shorter maturities than residential mortgages or construction loans. Then, this difference
in the loan maturity can explain the different behaviour in bank lending, consistently with the
logic previously explained.
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Graph 5. Response of lnCOM_IND_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 6. Response of lnAGRIC_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER
8.2 The Impact of Shocks on the Growth Rate of Loans
Now we want to examine the impact of shocks to off-balance sheet credit exposure
and to securities market value on the growth rate of loans (total loans and specific categories
of loans). In general, the results obtained from this specification are quite consistent with the
outcomes of the panel fixed effects estimation, given that we still observe a negative impact
of off-balance sheet credit exposure on the growth rate of total loans and we notice a different
behaviour in bank lending depending on the category of loans.
As before, we start the analysis of the results observing the impact of shocks to the
off-balance sheet credit derivative exposure (graph 7) and to the market value of on-balance
sheet securities (graph 8) on the total amount of loans.
Graph 7. Response of G_TOTAL_LOANS to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 8. Response of G_TOTAL_LOANS to lnMARKET_SECUR
An increase in the off-balance credit exposure may imply a decrease in the growth rate of
loans: this effect is statistically significant only for some time periods, but it is particularly
accentuated after a time lag of 4 quarters. Also a rise in the securities market value may be
associated with a decrease in the growth rate of loans, but such drop is not significant and
concerns mainly the first quarter after the shock.
The analysis of the impact of shocks on the growth rate of loans is complementary to
the study of the effects of the same shocks on the amount of loans: indeed, in this case, we
can observe a negative impact of off-balance sheet credit exposure on the growth rate of
loans, while this effect was not clear in the specification considering the amount of bank
lending (in logs). In any case, this evidence is consistent with the observed trend in bank
lending over the last decade: indeed, apart from the quarters immediately following
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Lehman’s bankruptcy, we notice a decreasing but still positive growth rate in total loans. For
this reason, it is reasonable to argue that an increase in off-balance sheet exposure may
produce a reduction in the growth rate of loans, but can induce a negative growth rate only
under particular conditions of financial stress in the banking system.
Then we can discuss the results of the analysis for specific categories of loans. Indeed,
we obtain different results depending on loan maturity: indeed, a positive shock to off-
balance credit exposure has usually a negative impact on bank lending for long-term loans
and mortgages while it shows a positive effect on bank lending for short-term loans, aimed at
financing entrepreneurial activities.
Let us consider the results for residential (graph 9) and non-residential (graph 10)
mortgages. In both cases, we generally observe some decrease in the growth rate of
Graph 9. Response of G_RESID_MORT to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 10. Response of G_NONRES_MORT to lnCRE_EXP_DER
mortgages and in particular this effect is statistically significant after 3 quarters following the
time of the shock.
Similar results concern the impact of off-balance sheet credit exposure on the growth
rate of construction loans (graph 11) and of real estate loans (graph 12). Indeed, after the
shock, the growth rate of real estate loans decreases and the negative effect is significant after
3 and 7 quarters. Also the growth rate of construction loans seems to be lower after the shock,
but in this case the impact is not significant (at least given a 5% confidence interval).
Graph 11. Response of G_CONSTR_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 12 Response of G_REAL_EST_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER
The conclusions for these long-term mortgages and loans are then consistent with our
hypothesis: indeed, in such cases, the negative effect due to the potential and actual losses
from the off-balance sheet credit exposure prevails, given that we cannot observe for such
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long-term loans the positive impact due to the maturity transformation function of
securitisation.
Finally, we can observe the effects on the growth rate of commercial and industrial
loans (graph 13) and of agricultural loans (graph 14). For commercial and industrial loans, an
increase in off-balance sheet credit exposure implies a rise in the growth rate of loans, at least
after 2 quarters; then, we can notice some different credit cycles, due to the existence of
effects of different sign. For agricultural loans, we also notice an increasing trend, at least
until the 5th quarter after the shock. Then, apart from the drop of the growth rate in the 4th
quarter, the impact of the shocks on the growth rate of loans to entrepreneurial activities
should confirm the argument that credit securitisations may have a positive impact on short-
term bank lending. Indeed, in this case, the positive effect due to the maturity transformation
function is stronger than the negative one due to the potential and actual losses from credit
exposure.
Graph 13 Response of G_COM_IND_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 14 Response of G_AGRIC_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER
In conclusion, we can summarize the results obtained from the Panel VAR analysis as
follows:
1) An increase in off-balance sheet credit exposure may have a negative impact on the growth
rate of total loans and of several categories of loans, due to the potential and actual losses
related to the off-balance sheet activities.
2) The effects on the single categories of loans depend on their maturity: the positive impact
of credit securitisation on bank lending prevails for short-term loans, such as commercial and
industrial loans, while the negative effect is stronger for long-term loans, such as mortgages
or real estate loans.
3) There is evidence – in the very short run - of a contagion risk effect due to an increase in
off-balance sheet credit exposure. This effect concerns more the off-balance sheet activities
than the on-balance sheet securities because the former ones usually imply a higher credit risk
for the bank.
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8.3 Robustness and diagnostics of the results
After presenting the key results of the panel VAR analysis, we have to discuss some
aspects concerning the robustness of the observed effects as well as about the use of
diagnostic tests in this framework.
Firstly, I have checked the robustness of the results, as far it concerns the choice of
the appropriate order for the time lags. Indeed, I have run the panel VAR analysis also for
other specifications including different number of lags. Apart from the main analysis, based
on the introduction of 6 quarter lags, I have also estimated the model for 2, 4 and 8 lags. In
particular, in the appendix A1, I present the results of the analysis for the estimation of the
model with 4 lags. As we can notice from a comparison of the graphs for the impulse
response functions, the change of specification doesn’t affect significantly the results.
Nevertheless, the model with 6 quarter lags is to be preferred, because more results are
significant under this specification and then the discussed effects can be better observed. On
the other hand, the specifications for 2 and 8 lags are not appropriate, the first one because it
doesn’t take into account the complete dynamics of the lagged effects, the second one
because the lagged impact after 8 quarters is almost irrelevant.
Moreover, we have to consider some issues about the diagnostics of the results
obtained from the panel VAR model. In fact, the diagnostics is a shortcoming of the current
empirical analyses using this estimation framework, because of the specific nature of the
model. Indeed, in a pure time-series framework, after estimating a VAR model, we can
usually perform some tests to check for residual autocorrelation, for normally distributed
residuals or for the stability conditions of the VAR estimates, as well as to obtain lag-order
selection statistics for VARs. But these tests, constructed for a pure time-series framework,
cannot be directly implemented in a panel VAR framework, where we also have to consider a
panel dimension. In particular, Banerjee, Eberhardt and Reade (2010) examine the issue in
the context of non-stationary panels and employ Monte Carlo simulations to study the
distributions and rejection frequencies for standard time-series diagnostic procedures, such as
tests for residual autocorrelation, normality, functional form. Then they show that,
notwithstanding the difficulties in extending misspecification tests to a panel setting, proper
estimators have sound residual properties and then diagnostic tests based on such estimators
have power in detecting misspecification. But the tests to be used are different: indeed, we
have to implement – also in terms of software programming – some tests specific to dynamic
panels, such as the m-statistics proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for residual serial
correlation, or the test for the specification of lag lengths suggested by Holtz Eakin, Newey
and Rose (1988). For this reason, the lack of diagnostic testing procedures in panel
econometrics, if compared to their diffusion in the time-series domain, cannot be solved
simply by the application of the time-series procedure, but requires an autonomous
implementation of some specific tests for the panel VAR model. Then, this will be an aspect
to be developed in the future research.
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9. Conclusions
The empirical analysis presented in this paper has shown that the banking system may
play a key role in the amplification of the financial shocks to the real economy: an excessive
recourse to credit securitisation and to off-balance sheet activities in the management of bank
assets and liabilities may particularly increase the size of the mechanism, by which financial
shocks may produce a negative impact on bank lending. Indeed, the systematic use of the
above mentioned practices, by augmenting the leverage of financial intermediaries, sensibly
increases the credit risks born by banks and this may affect the financial stability of the
banking system, in situations of contagion risk. Indeed, in such cases, the banks which are
more concerned about a potential default of their counterparties, are not willing to expand the
credit provision to the private sector and, actually, they can be interested in reducing the
amount of available credit.
The paper examines this topic by proposing a Panel VAR analysis, which studies the
impact of the shocks affecting bank off-balance credit derivative exposure and on-balance
securities, in order to observe the effects on the amount and on the growth rate of bank
lending. The results of the analysis illustrate that an increase in off-balance credit exposure,
mainly determined by a rise in securitisation activities, may produce a sensible reduction in
the growth rate of bank lending, especially for some categories of loans characterized by
long-term maturity, such as residential and non-residential mortgages, real estate loans. For
other classes of loans, such as commercial and industrial loans, an increase in asset
securitisation may induce an increase in the growth rate, but we still observe in some periods
a negative effect due to the losses born by banks because of the enormous rise in off-balance
activities.
The conclusions of the paper may have some relevant policy implications in terms of
banking regulation, by emphasizing the need for specific rules limiting an excessive increase
of off-balance sheet items, especially when the high credit risk related to such activities may
determine some important losses for the bank balance sheet. In this perspective, it is certainly
useful to increase the regulatory requirements for bank capital in order to raise the loss
absorbency capacity of banks against potential shocks, but this solution might not be per se
sufficient to preserve the financial stability of the banking system: indeed, it could be also
important to reduce the potential causes of such losses, by focusing also on the numerous off-
balance activities of the banking sector.
Finally, the preliminary results obtained in this empirical analysis may suggest some
guidelines for future research: indeed, we have observed that an increase in off-balance credit
derivative exposure, mainly due to loan securitisation, may determine both a positive and a
negative effect on bank lending. Moreover, most of the insignificant results in the panel fixed
effects estimation and in the panel VAR analysis are determined by the off-setting between
effects of opposite signs, when none of them prevails on the other one. For this reason, given
the importance of this outcome for the conclusions and for the policy implications of the
analysis, future research plans should aim – both from the theoretical point of view and from
the empirical one - to disentangle this puzzle due to the existence of heterogeneous and
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opposite effects. Indeed, while the existing literature on securitisation and bank lending has
focused the attention on the positive impact of securitisation – especially with regard to the
originator banks – a key contribution of this paper has been to emphasize the existence of a
negative impact due to the actual and potential losses from the off-balance credit exposure.
In particular, the paper formulates some hypotheses about the sources and the time
dynamics of the effects - in order to understand the conditions under which the positive
impact may dominate the negative one and vice versa – and then presents some results
suggesting some plausibility of these hypotheses. Then, in the future research, it could be
interesting to derive and to compare these opposite effects in a theoretical model of banking
as well as to check the robustness of the discussed results by introducing a deeper empirical
analysis, also based on a broader dataset. In particular, regarding the empirical study, some
developments of the presented analysis can be achieved in the following directions: in the
diagnostics of the results obtained from the panel VAR analysis, through the implementation
of some specific tests for dynamic panels to this estimation framework; in the choice of the
estimation framework to account for the role of contagion risk, eventually through the
introduction of a non-linear switching model aimed to consider the impact of contagion risk
on the behaviour of the lending variable.
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Appendix
In this appendix I present the results of the Panel VAR analysis for the estimation of
the model with 4 lags, in order to conduct a robustness check for the choice of the main
specification, including 6 lags.
The Impact of Shocks on the Amount of Loans
Graph 1. Response of lnTOTAL_LOANS to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 2. Response of lnTOTAL_LOANS to lnMARKET_SECUR
Graph 3. Response of lnRESID_MORT to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 4. Response of lnCONSTR_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER
Graph 5. Response of lnCOM_IND_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 6. Response of lnAGRIC_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER
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The Impact of Shocks on the Growth Rate of Loans
Graph 7. Response of G_TOTAL_LOANS to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 8. Response of G_TOTAL_LOANS to lnMARKET_SECUR
Graph 9. Response of G_RESID_MORT to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 10. Response of G_NONRES_MORT to lnCRE_EXP_DER
Graph 11. Response of G_CONSTR_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 12 Response of G_REAL_EST_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER
Graph 13 Response of G_COM_IND_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER Graph 14 Response of G_AGRIC_LOAN to lnCRE_EXP_DER
